“If you’ve fried potato cakes, you can’t fry chips.” With the spring recruitment season having just drawn to a close, this saying has struck a chord among young job seekers. It reflects a current trend in the recruitment market: even if you have work experience with a particular brand, you may not necessarily be able to do similar work at another company, because experience needs to be ‘vertical’—it must be in a directly relevant field. The term ‘vertical’ is short for ‘vertical category’, meaning a focus on a specific field, with little encouragement for crossing boundaries. Yet a decade ago, the exact opposite concept – the ‘slash youth’ – was all the rage. Slash youth emphasised multiple identities and broad interests: writer, programmer, photographer; the more slashes, the more pride one seemed to take in it. In just ten short years, societal values have shifted from encouraging diversity to emphasising specialisation. In truth, the standards for what constitutes the ‘youth’ demographic have always been in flux. From ‘revolutionary youth’ to ‘intellectual youth’, and on to ‘striving youth’ and ‘lying-flat youth’, the term ‘youth’ itself has been repeatedly redefined and shaped by society. Every generation of young people bears the labels affixed to them by society. So, whose ‘youth’ is it, really? Prior to the modern era, the status of young people in Chinese society was determined primarily by their position within the family hierarchy, rather than by their age. As long as their parents were alive, children remained children, even if they were fifty years old. Young people emerged as an independent social group in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With the advent of modern schools, young people had, for the first time, the opportunity to gather independently amongst their peers; meanwhile, national crises and military defeats also fuelled societal anxiety regarding the younger generation. In his essay ‘On the Youth of China’, Liang Qichao wrote, ‘If the youth are wise, the nation is wise; if the youth are strong, the nation is strong.’ This indicates that society bestows value upon young people, rather than this value arising naturally from within them. Chen Yingfang refers to this logic as the ‘utility’ of youth, meaning that society recognises the value of young people for the sake of social needs, rather than simply acknowledging their characteristics and rights. In 1915, Chen Duxiu founded *New Youth*, using contrast to depict the ideal image of the youth and to outline the identity and behavioural norms expected of them. During the May Fourth Movement, radical youths rebelled against patriarchy, feudal ethics and old authorities; yet later, under state pressure, this rebellion was redirected, and the discourse of the youth shifted towards serving societal goals, transforming radical youths into revolutionary youths. After 1949, the state’s expectations of young people became more clearly defined: patriotism, collectivism, loyalty and dedication. Young people were organised into the Communist Youth League, the militia and youth shock brigades; the media promoted role models among the youth; and individuals’ political conduct was recorded. This system required young people to ‘rebel’ in appearance, whilst in essence submitting to the new order. By the 1990s, social structures had shifted, and young people began to discuss their lives in their own terms, using terms such as ‘going into business’, ‘going abroad’ and ‘speculating in the stock market’. The magazine *China Youth* once published a letter signed ‘Pan Xiao’, expressing the confusion felt by young people following the shattering of their ideals. In reality, ‘Pan Xiao’ was a fictional character created by the editors based on the experiences of several young people, yet her words authentically reflected the sentiments of an entire generation. Since then, youth discourse has followed two main trends: firstly, internal differentiation among young people, with the emergence of distinct subcultures—such as the ‘Shamate’ subculture, the ‘2D’ subculture and fan communities—each possessing its own unique language; secondly, the continuous adaptation of official discourse, which has sought to engage with young people through new media and adopt a more approachable style. Consequently, youth discourse has come to present a landscape where official narratives and self-expression intertwine. In recent years, videos such as Bilibili’s *The Rising Generation* have sought to portray the ideal youth in a way that appeals to young people, yet public opinion has been divided. Whilst some were moved, others pointed out that the video represented only a minority of young people with privileged circumstances, whilst the majority face pressures such as renting, employment and intense competition. Similarly, topics such as ‘996’ and ‘lying flat’ have become expressions of young people’s reality. History shows that youth anxiety is not a personal issue, but rather the result of shifting social demands. Every generation of young people faces the pressure of adapting to changing external standards and defining their own place in society. Whether it be ‘literary youths’, ‘slashers’ or ‘lying-flat youths’, each has sought to carve out their own space for self-expression in different historical periods. Youth anxiety serves as a mirror through which society reflects itself onto young people, whilst also representing their ongoing struggle to find their place in the world.